Chaos at Calais
For those well-to-do liberal Europhiles trying to get their Renaults and VWs across the channel this summer, the chaos at Calais where some 4,000 young men from the Middle East and Africa are trying to break into Britain nightly, is probably the first time that any of them have personally experienced the effects of mass immigration, or in this case attempted mass immigration.
The fact that the would-be migrants are from outside the European Union is a barely significant distinction because if they were given Euro-papers giving them leave to remain, these would entitle them legally to enter the United Kingdom. As it is, once in the EU, in Italy and Greece, they can pass through national borders under the EU’s Schengen treaty without check until they wind up at the UK-France border where Schengen, thankfully, doesn’t apply.
Huge Numbers wanting to come to Britain
While Germany and Scandinavia offer similar accommodation and cash benefits to asylum-seekers and refugees, Britain is the preferred target because of (a) the English language, (b) Britain’s Human Rights-conscious judges, who rarely permit any illegal migrants to be deported, and (c) the UK’s current reputation as easy to find work in.
It is worth seeing what the dimensions and direction of the immigration pressure on Western and Northern Europe and the overseas British-derived countries in North America and Australasia potentially are. Nobody is clamouring to get into Eastern European countries like Poland and Ukraine, or Mexico and Central America. Indeed these countries are sources of immigration pressure themselves. Across the world the pressure to receive immigrants is overwhelmingly on the ABCANZ[1] countries, the English-speaking countries of original overseas British settlement and Britain itself, and on the GSCs[2], the other Germanic speaking countries mainly of northern Europe. These maintain technologically advanced and prosperous societies, elaborate social services, and the rule of law.
Sizes of receiving and sending populations compared
The crisis in Calais is but the tip of a very large global population pressure cooker, incubating a crisis which is going to get worse over the next 30 years unless both drastic short-term measures and long-term programmes are put in hand now.
The scale of the problem is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Population changes 1965-2015*
Principal Receiving Countries | Populations millions | Percentage Increases | |
1963-67 | 2013-15 | 1965-2015 | |
(a) ABCANZ[1] | 277 | 446 | 61% |
(b) GSC[2] | 117 | 134 | 14% |
Total Receiving Countries | 394 | 580 | 47% |
Principal Immigrant Sending Regions | (All figures approximate) | ||
(a) Africa (inc Egypt) | 300 | 1,000 | 233% |
(b) East Asia (excluding China, Japan, Korea) | 830 | 2,140 | 158% |
(c) Middle East | 56 | 180 | 216% |
Total Sending Regions | 1,186 | 3,320 | 180% |
Ratio Sending Populations to Receiving Populations |
3.0 |
5.7 |
90% |
*Sources: World Bank 2013-2015; Whittaker’s Almanac 1966-1980
Altogether the aggregate of ABCANZ[1] countries’ populations has risen by around 60% with the USA at 80%. This increase is largely due to immigration from African, Asian and Latin-American sources and has by far the heaviest influence on this aggregate. The eight GS countries’ populations (Germany Switzerland, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) have risen in aggregate by about 15% from 117 million in the mid-1960s to an estimated 134 million in mid-2015. The natural increase[3] of mature European-descended populations is about 0.3% per annum or 15% over 50 years[4].
The immigrant sending countries in Africa, East Asia, Middle East and some Latin American countries average about 20-25 per thousand per year natural increase (2-2.5% per annum), with the inevitable consequence that these populations which were about three times as big as those of the receiving countries are now six times as big.
Consequences of the huge rise in African, East Asian, Middle East and Latin American populations
Faced with the prospect in the 1960s of a similar tripling of its already huge population, successive Chinese governments have pursued a one-child per family policy for 50 years. Nonetheless, with all the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party behind the policy, China’s population has still grown from about 750 million in the mid-1960s to about 1300 million in 2010-15, an increase of about 70%, or 1% per annum, with negligible immigration. At the same time as the policy has really begun to bite, in the last 30 years, China has engineered a huge programme of economic growth[5] which has allowed skilled employment to increase more or less in step, and keep its population more or less satisfied.
It is clear that unless the African, East Asian, Middle East and Latin American (AEML)[6] populations halve their population growth rate from the present 2-2.5% per annum to less than 1 per cent, there is no conceivable economic programme that will satisfy the bulk of their populations. Without this and with the attractions of the West before their populations through the Internet, the pressure on the West’s immigrant receiving countries (ABCANZ and GSC) will only grow, not reduce in the years ahead.
Only foreign aid explicitly targeted at (a) population control based on contraception, and (b) the production of tradeable goods and commodities over a 50 year period will have any effect on immigration pressures from the AEML countries.
Eliminating the immigration problem at Calais and other ports accessing the United Kingdom, in the short-term
The scenes in the approaches to Dover and Calais should bring shame on the governments of Britain and France. The primary, arguably the only justification for the powers given to democratic government by their people is to keep them safe from foreign invaders, something which the current British government is lamentably failing to do.
The number one reason why around 4,000 mostly young men have come to Calais is that they believe, with reason, that if they manage to break into Britain by hook or by crook they will not be deported from Britain when they are discovered. They will not be deterred from crossing from Calais by the withdrawal of benefits, or even a period in detention, so long as it is in the UK. Only quick and certain deportation will do the trick.
Legal obstacles to deporting illegal immigrants
Generally the legal obstacles derive from the highly sentimentalised approach of the liberal-labour-conservative (LibLabCon) consensus, which has obstructed a sensible British-people-first policy on immigration since the second world war.
Specifically, the Human rights Act (HRA) articles 3, 5 and 8 particularly, have highly pro-foreigner interpretations placed on them by the judiciary sitting in the Appeal Court, the Supreme Court, and especially in the various Immigration Tribunals and Special Immigration Appeals Commission. This latter was set up by the Labour government in 1997 especially to hear appeals against deportation orders made by the Home Secretary, i.e. against itself. It should be simply abolished.
The most fundamental change and the only one which will have real effect in the years ahead of mounting pressure, is to replace the HRA by a British Rights and Duties Act (BRDA). This would implicitly remove questions of deportation of non-British citizens from the courts altogether and make it an administrative decision by the Home Secretary on behalf of the British people, from which appeals to the courts would be excluded completely[7]. The agreed international rules on asylum seeking will need to be unwaveringly applied – applications have to be made in the first safe country that the applicant gets to, usually in the nearest British Embassy or Consulate. All airlines landing in the UK will have to ensure that their passengers have a valid entry document and the list of booked passengers has been agreed by the British Border Force at the intended Airport. (The USA has done this for years.)
If despite these precautions, an illegal immigrant gets into the UK, his status under the new BRDA will still be that he is outside the Law of this country and not entitled to its protection.
Practical Obstacles to Deporting Illegal Immigrants
The main practical obstacle is determining the illegal immigrants’ countries of origin and agreeing arrangements with these countries to receive them back.
It is clear that these arrangements will have to include a cash sum to the governments concerned and a small, once only, payment to the illegals themselves[8].
At £2,000 per head[9] split between the government and the individual, the cost would be £10 million to clear the immediate Calais problem. This has to be compared with the cost of the next tranche of fencing (£12 million) and losses to road hauliers of £5 million per day, not to speak of the huge anxiety all vehicle drivers currently suffer as they consider the risk of being attacked by gangs of illegal immigrants around the tunnel entrances and approach roads to Calais.
The Role of Libya
The chaos ensuing in Libya after the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi – which David Cameron has described as his finest foreign policy achievement (yes, really!) – places an imperative on the British government to do something to restore order in Libya and help itself at the same time.
First it must be recognized that Libya is really two countries – Tripolitania (capital Tripoli) in the West and Cyrenaica (capital Benghazi) 1,300 miles to the East, with natural resources (oil and gas) divided roughly 40 : 60 between them.
Secondly, while Libya has been the jumping off point for thousands trying to get into Italy and the rest of the EU, its attractions are now diminished (but not eliminated for Africans) by a route through Turkey and the Greek islands.
Safe Havens and Enterprise Towns
Britain, with Italy and the government of Cyrenaica, should concentrate on establishing safe havens in Cyrenaica, while France, with Italy and the Tripolitanian government, concentrates on Tripolitania. Trying to broker political accords between Tripoli and Benghazi, as the EU and Britain, France and Italy are currently trying to do, is a complete waste of time. Practically, something needs actually to be done.
There are tens of thousands of refugees in Libya itself exposed to the depredations of one form of Islamist gang or another. Britain has literally billions of pounds in the 2015-16 budget of the Department of International Development (DfID) which it will struggle to spend. The safe havens would consist of thousands of homes of the flat-pack type manufactured in Britain, with proper sanitation and electricity. These would be transported by the Royal Navy’s two Albion class landing platforms (LPD).
Economic Activity needed as well in the Safe Havens
These new safe haven towns would be a gift to Libya, but their predominantly young population will need things to do. This is where British finance and engineering, and Libyan oil could come in, building on the examples of the Gulf states (where many Libyans work now).
Where the Calais migrants can be sent
Part of the bargain with the embryonic governments in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica is that they receive back all those in Calais who travelled from Libya across the Mediterranean, with the presumption that they all did. Building the homes needed to house them is vital for this purpose, which is where the British mobile home/ flat packing industry comes in. Something like 10 year contracts from the DfID will be required to give the manufacturers incentives to expand their production lines.
Gains all round from this proposition
It’s a win-win proposition. For the Libyan peoples, including refugees already there, for the EU – a properly policed Mediterranean border, for the people of Calais and their misguided refugees, and for British manufacturers.
End notes
[1] ABCANZ = United States of America, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
[2] GSC = Germanic Speaking Countries: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland.
[3] Excess of births over deaths.
[4] Britain’s population has risen from 53.8 million in 1965 to 65.1 million (estimated) in 2015, a rise of 20% or 0.4% per annum, of which at least half or 5 million is accounted for by net primary immigration from the sending regions in table 1 plus Eastern Europe.
[5] Around 6-10% per annum.
[6] AEML = Africa, East Asia, Middle East, Latin America
[7] When the Home Secretary decides that entry of a foreign national into the UK is “not in the public interest”, this is not appealable in the courts. However, once an undesirable is in the UK the Courts apply every means to prevent the individual being deported back to their own country. The current case is a Yemini-born Islamist preacher, known only as FM, who cannot be deported to the Yemen according to the Courts’ interpretation of Article 3 of the HRA because he has a justified fear of persecution there. Yet he frequently travels to the Yemen, of his own free will, and even more daft is allowed back into the UK each time – madness.
[8] Australia has demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach. In agreement with the Government of Papua New Guinea, two boatloads of illegal immigrants have been diverted there in return for a cash payment. There have been no repeats.
[9] The fine imposed on truck drivers found to be carrying an illegal into Britain.